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BECENT CASE COMMENTS
the directors and stockholders of the new corporation are the same
as those of the old. This, however, would necessitate piercing the
corporate veil, which courts hesitate to do unless fraud appears.
Therefore, that the court's failure to pass upon the question seems
justified. 5
W. H. S.
DIVORCE - COLLATERAL ATTACK BY SUBSEQUENT SPOUSE-
ESTOPPEL. - P, inducing and aiding D to divorce H, in Tennessee,
so that she might marry him, told D not to bother to have her at-
torney correct an allegation in her bill that H probably claimed
legal residence in Massachusetts. The Tennessee court, finding H
to be a nonresident, gave H notice by publication only. H did'not
appear and he never objected to the divorce decree. On the con-
trary he relied upon it and married another woman. P married
D immediately after the divorce and lived with her for nearly seven
years. He sought to annul this marriage on the ground that the
divorce was invalid, first, because the Tennessee court had no
jurisdiction of the subject matter, as the parties were not domiciled
in that state; and second, because if H were domiciled in Tennessee,
the divorce decree was lacking in due process for want of sufficient
notice to H. Held, that the parties were domiciled in Tennessee,
but P is estopped to question the validity of the notice to H. Saul
v. Saul.'
The question as to whether a subsequent spouse of a party to
a divorce may collaterally attack that divorce is one which can not
be answered categorically. There is great confusion among the
cases, which show a conflict in the generalities of language em-
ployed, as well as in the holdings. The answer is that the later
spouse may or may not be allowed to collaterally attack the divorce
depending on many varied circumstances. One observation worthy
of note is the fact that in former cases no distinction had been
drawn between cases involving lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the divorce, as when neither party has established a
domicil in the divorce forum, and cases involving lack of juris-
diction over the person of the nonresident defendant. Total lack
of power in a court to deal with the subject matter of a suit goes
125 Cf. Southport Petroleum Co. v. N. L. R. B., 62 S. Ct. 452, 86 L. Ed. 397
(U. S. 1942).
'122 F. (2d) 64 (App. D. 0. 1941).
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not merely to the protection of the parties in securing a, fair hear-
ing, but to the authority of the court itself. For this reason some
eases take the view that considerations of estoppel, unclean hands,
and unconscionable conduct, ordinarily applicable in equity, have
no power to prevent one from challenging the court's power in
this fundamental sense.2  On the other hand, the opposite view
is strongly supported by some courts on the grounds of estoppel.z
The court, in the instant case, made the aforementioned distinction.
The court said that an attack on the ground that notice was lacking
in due process does not reach down to the fundamental authority
of the court, but affects rather the personal protections which it
is required to give the defendant; and that, therefore, principles of
estoppel are applicable.4  It has been said that the principle that
property shall not be taken without due process of law, including
notice to the owners, is evidently one for his benefit, not for the
benefit of third parties.5 The right to notice is treated as a personal
right in that it may be waived by appearance,6 whereas lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit can not be waived
by appearance, nor conferred by consent. 7 Generally it is said that
the owner of property may waive constitutional protections if he
choose, and no one is entitled to set them up for him."
Be this as it may, the court need draw no unusual distinction,
if such this may be considered, in order to allow the estoppel.
There is authority for estopping a subsequent spouse from chal-
lenging a divorce decree even where jurisdiction was lacking in re-
gard to the subject matter of the suit2 However, it is recognized
that a stranger may collaterally attack a decree of divorce for want
2 Smith v. Foto, 285 Mich. 361, 280 N. W. 790, 120 A. L. R. 801 (1938);
Fischer v. Fischer, 254 N. Y. 463, 173 N. E. 680 (1930); Kiessenbeck v.
Kissenbeck, 145 Ore. 82, 26 P. (2d) 58 (1933).
3 Goodloe v. Hawk, 113 F. (2d) 753 (App. D. C. 1940); Fairelough v. St.
Amand, 217 Ala. 19, 114 So. 472 (1927) ; Van Slyke v. Van Slyke, 186 Mich.
324, 152 N. W. 921 (1915); Margulies v. Margulies, 109 N. J. Eq. 391, 157
AtI. 676 (1931).
4 See Saul v. Saul, 122 F. (2d) 64, 70 (App. D. 0. 1941).
See People v. Turner, 2 N. Y. Supp. 253, 255 (1888), aff'd, 117 N. Y. 227,
22 N. E. 1022 (1889).
0 See Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 623, 9 L. Ed. 1181 (U. S. 1838);
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 733, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1877); Scott v. McNeal,
154 U. S. 34, 46, 14 S. Ct. 1108, 38 L. Ed. 896 (1894).
7Holton v. Holton, 64 Ore. 290, 129 Pac. 532 (1913) ; 17 AM. Jun. 301.
s See People v. Turner, 117 N. Y. 227, 234, 22 N. E. 1022 (1889); Detmold
v. Drake, 46 N. Y. 318, 325 (1871).
9 Goodloe v. Hawk, 113 F. (2d) 753 (App. D. C. 1940); Kaufman v. Kauf-
man, 177 App. Div. 162, 163 N. Y. Supp. 566 (1917) ; Van Slyke v. Van Slyke,
186 Mich. 324, 152 N. W. 921 (1915); Notes (1935) 99 A. L. R.. 1309, 1316,
(1939) 120 A. L. R. 815, 826; 17 Am. Jun. 395.
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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
of jurisdiction of the court entering it where his property rights
are injuriously affected.10 Courts have denied collateral attack by
a subsequent spouse upon grounds of their participation in pro-
curing the divorce, or estoppel generally." The doctrine of laches
has also been applied.-"
It is therefore apparent that the instant case is supported by
authority, as well as by reason and justice. The equitable principles
of clean hands and estoppel, once admitted, apply to bar this suit.
Here the plaintiff participated in procuring the divorce; he has
waited an unreasonable time to complain; and he was principally
responsible for the error of pleading that led to the improper
notice.
It is not contended that subsequent spouses, or third parties
generally, can not, or should not, be allowed to collaterally attack
divorces. The purpose of the writer is to point out that no broad
generalization can be formed, but that "circumstances alter cases",
sometimes forbidding, sometimes demanding the application of the
equitable principles of estoppel.
H. L. W. JR.
EQUITY-CLEAN HANDS-INIQUITY OF ONE PLAINTIFF BARS
ALI,.- A group of persons sued tb enforce a deed of trust given
as security for the unpaid purchase price of shares of stock which
plaintiffs sold defendants. Two of the plaintiffs had been guilty of
such fraudulent conduct in regard to the sale as to be barred from
equity, but others were innocent of any misconduct. Held, that
the innocent plaintiffs could not claim the benefit of a fraud per-
petrated by their coplaintiffs. Ford v. Buffalo Eagle Colliery Co.'
The court stated that "the bar of the clean-hands maxim is
not employed for the punishment of wrongdoers; rather, it is in-
troduced to protect the court of equity and the party defendant
from having the powers of the court used in bringing about an
inequitable result in the particular litigation before it."' There
is substantial authority to support such a principle as the basis
0 Adams v. Adams, 154 Mass. 290, 28 N. E. 260 (1891) ; Sammons v. Pike,
108 Minn. 291, 120 N. W. 540 (1909) ; 17 Am. JuR. 395; Note (1935) 99 A. L.
R. 13091 1316.
"Van Slyke v. Van Slyke, Margulies v. Margulies, both supra n. 3; Notes
(1937) 109 A. L. R. 1018, 1026, (1939) 120 A. I. B. 815, 826.
1 Goodloe v. Hawk, 113 F. (2d) 753 (App. D. C. 1940).
1 122 F. (2d) 555 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941).
- Id. at 563.
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